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ABSTRACT
This paper presents results of estimating an exchange rate equation
in light of theoretical considerations regarding changes in sterilization
and intervention policy and tax policy which imply that the coefficients in
the equation will not behave as fixed parameters in a given sample period,
as standard econometric practice assumes. We compare the results of
ordinary least squares and a random coefficients model of the Japanese
Yen—U.S. dollar exchange rate during the floating period of July 1973
through June 1982.
When systematic end of year policy changes affecting Japanese reserves
are explicitly modeled, both OLS and the random coefficients model show
increased explanatory power. The random coefficients model appears to be
superior to OLS however; by allowing the coefficients to vary over time as
required by the economic theory discussed above, estimates of the mean
response coefficients for the floating period all have the hypothesized
sign, and explanatory power is sharply increased.
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This paper reports significantly improved results from estimation
during the 'floating' [July 1973 through June 1982] period of a monetary
equilibrium rational expectations (MERE) expression for the yen/dollar
exchange rate. There are two sources of the improvement over results
reported elsewhere in Makin (1981, 1982) and over results with exchange
rate equations in general which1 as Meese and Rogoff (1983) have
demonstrated, have been somewhat disheartening.
The first and most important source of improvement arises from
allowance for intervention policy and tax policy regime changes. More
recently, Branson (1983) has paid attention to the former while Makin
(1984) addresses the latter. A rational expression for the exchange rate
which incorporates intervention and sterilization together with after—tax
uncovered interest parity, conditions the impact upon the exchange rate of
actual and expected changes in explanatory variables upon the degree of
intervention and sterilization and on relevant effective marginal tax
rates, each of which may vary considerably over time. Obviously this
violates the assumption that an exchange rate equation with fixed
coefficients can be estimated over a sample period during which there have
been changes in the degree of intervention and sterilization, in effective
marginal tax rates or both. One way to deal with the complex nonlinear
response of coefficients to continuous and often simultaneous changes over
time in intervention/sterilization policy and effective marginal tax rates
is to hypothesize that coefficients so impacted behave as random variables
with a stable mean and finite variance. Such an approach is employed in
this paper.
1The random coefficients assumption will of course be violated if, in
addition to a random pattern, there exists some systematic pattern to the
policy regime and its impact on coefficients. It is necessary tocontrol
for any systematic element of policy regime behavior. In the case of Japan
there emerges a large and systematic 'end of year' pattern whereby reserves
are allowed to increase sharply in December and to fall by a nearly equal
amount in January——almost as if Japan moves onto a quasi—fixed exchange
rate regime during these months. Employing dummy variables to control for
this systematic part of Japanese intervention policy not only improves the
fit of our exchange rate equation but, by eliminating significant
'outliers' which violate the random coefficients model assumptions yields
results that are fully consistent with the MERE model. In short, the
second source of our improved results, controlling for systematic Japanese
intervention behavior at year end, is sufficient to preclude rejection of
the hypothesis that nonsystematic intervention/sterilization and tax policy
regime changes in both the United States and Japan require that arandom
coefficients model be employed to test hypotheses embedded in rational
models of exchange rate determination.
Before proceeding to specifics, it is worthwhile to place this
investigation within the context of two non—contradictory but different
approaches to improving the fit of exchange rate equationsthat have
emerged over the past decade from extensive and often innovative empirical
investigations of exchange ratebehavior.1 One approach, whereby assets
denominated in different currencies are viewed as imperfect substitutes,
points to inclusion in exchange rate equations of'left out variables'
needed to account for a systematic difference between the forward rate and
the expected spot rate. The imperfect substitutes hypothesis suggests
2significant deviations from uncovered interest parity which are consistent
with either foreign exchange market inefficiency (generally rejected as a
prior hypothesis) or time varying risk premiums. In turn, since the
existence of time varying risk premiums is consistent with imperfect
substitutability between assets denominated in different currencies, it
thereby——given risk aversion——implies a significant effect of sterilized
intervention on exchange rates.2
The second approach, followed here, attributes less significance to
deviations from uncovered interest parity as a source of poor exchange rate
equation fits and attributes more significance to policy regime changes.
The operational result of the second approach is to try and improve the fit
of exchange rate equations by allowing for both systematic and random
effects of policy regime changes. It is worth noting that empirical tests
under both approaches may be biased by failing to specify uncovered
interest parity in after—tax terms.3 We avoid such bias by employing an
after—tax expression for uncovered interest parity. Once estimated, our
random coefficients model which includes as explanatory variables only
measures of relative excess money supplies in Japan and the United States
performs quite well and displays no gross symptoms of left out variables.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 briefly
lays out an intervention/sterilization and tax policy regime augmented
version of the MERE model, first developed for a simple floating regime by
Bilson (1979) and later extended, first to an intervention/sterilization
regime model by Makin (1981) and then extended to include tax regimes by
Makin (1984).Section 3 describes briefly the random coefficients
procedure employed to estimate the model. Section 4 presents results of
estimating the model for the yen—dollar exchange rate with monthly data
3running from July, 1983 through June, 1982.Some concluding comments are
presented in Section 5.
2.Exchange Rate lodel
Here a rational expression for the equilibrium exchange rate is
derived from a simple structure including money demand equations in two
countries, purchasing power parity (which can be expanded to allow for
'real' exchange rate changes) and an after—tax covered interest parity
equation. We also allow for official exchange market intervention and
the presence or absence of sterilization of effects of intervention on the
monetary base.
The solution to the two country model after some algebra and
iterative substitution is a parametized expression for the exchange rate in
terms of:relative (exogenous portions of) money supplies, relative real
output, and 'real' exchange rate changes. Parameters which determine the
exchange rate in terms of current actual and expected future values of
these variables include the income and interest elasticities of money
demand in each country, tax rates on interest income, and foreign exchange
gains and losses in each country and——of particular significance for the
investigation proposed here——the degree of sterilization and intervention
in each country.
A basic solution employing the procedure just outlined, following
Makin (1981, 1983) is obtained as follows. Based on log linear money
demand equations in countries '1' and '2,' purchasing power parity and
deviations therefrom ('real' exchange rate changes) an expression for the
log of the spot exchange rate may be written as
(1) = — aZt+dat+b(i1i2) +
4where:
=logof spot exchange rate (currency 1 price of currency
2).
=logof exogenous (not tied to sterilization) portion of
of monetary base in country 1 less log of exogenous
portion of monetary base in country 2.
=logof real income in country 1 less log of real income
in country 2.
z vector of disturbances which systematically cause
deviations from purchasing power parity.
ih(h=l,2) =thenominal interest rate in country h.
=disturbanceterm in money demand equation for country 1
less same term for country 2.
a income elasticity of money demand in country 1 (set equal
to that in country 2).
b interest elasticity of money demand in countries 1 and 2.
(Note:'a' and 'b' can be allowed to differ across
countries.)
0<0 = aterm capturing sterilization and intervention behavior
in countries 1 and 2. (00 with free floating and no
interventionin foreign exchange markets. See Appendix
for full derivation.)
Anexpression for the difference between nominal interest rates can be
derived from after tax covered interest parity:4
(2) ii =
where
ln(1+i) i for small i
=logof the forward rate at time t.
=logof the spot rate at time t.
—Oastk—
5and
=marginaltax rate on interest income in country 1.
=marginaltax rate on exchange gains in country 1.
Equation (2) says simply that if the tax on exchange gains r is less than
the tax on interest income then the interest differential between countries
1 and 2 will exceed the exchange gain or loss. Obviously j =c,the
considerations wash out and before and after—tax covered interest parity
conditions are identical.
In most cases, the tax on exchange gains is below the income tax rate.
See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co. (1979) for a full discussion. For U.S.
corporations k =0.30for positions held more than 12 months while =
0.48so that =1.35.In practice actual marginal income tax rates for
corporations as well as households may be lower and may vary considerably
over time. (See Tanzi (1982) and Estrella and Fubrer (1983)).
Traditionally, deviations from covered interest parity expressed by
equation (2) have been attributed to political risk and/or portfolio
balance considerations.5 Some current studies such as Ito (1983) have
found results for Japan—U.S. which are generally consistent with =1.0
during the 1975—80 period and consistent with< 1.0 thereafter. 3 < 1.0
is consistent with> r, contrary to expectations based on the U.S. tax
code. In contrast, Katz (1983) reports results for the United States and
seven industrial countries which suggest > 1.0 over the short run which
is another odd result, since usually short run exchange gains are taxed at
the same rate as interest income. Katz's results may be due partly to
measurement error since he in effect uses expected inflation differentials
to measure expected depreciation——thereby hypothesizing satisfactionof
purchasing power parity——and then estimates what amounts to an uncovered
6interest parity equation. In sum, while empirical evidence on is
inconclusive at this stage, some allowance for possible changes over time
is prudent.
If assets denominated in currencies 1 and 2 are perfect substitutes,
no risk premium separates the log of the forward rate, from the log of
the expected spot rate——at time t for time t+1, se+1. Therefore:
— 0 — t5t÷i•
Substituting from (3) into (2) gives:
(4) i1 —1 = t°t+i
—
Substitutingfrom (4) into (1) for —i2and rearranging terms
gives:
= se+1+
Substitutingiteratively to solve for t0t+i equation (5) becomes:
(6)
where
Equation (6) describes the spot exchange rate as being determined——in
a manner set by money demand parameters1 sterilization and intervention
7policy and tax rates——by current actual and expected future values of the
set of exogenous variables, de, ,andz defined above.
A primary conclusion from the discussion of exchange rate
determination summarized in equation (6) is the implied effect on the
exchange rate of current and prospective policies regarding intervention,
sterilization and tax rates applied to interest earnings and to foreign
exchange gains and losses. Announcement of expected future changes in such
policies will change the current equilibrium spot rate in the forward—
looking foreign exchange market even if current and prospective values of
exogenous variables remain unchanged.
Since 0 takes on a larger negative value as intervention is stepped up
to smooth exchange rates, the result of more aggressive intervention is to
reduce exchange rate changes in response to given changes in actual or
expected values of relative excess money supplies or other disturbances.
Considerable variation over a given sample period in the degree of exchange
market intervention will result in a poor fit of a fixed—coefficient
equation over that sample period. The same will hold true for changes in
effective marginal tax rates over a sample period. A possible remedy is to
control for any systematic changes in intervention policy or tax rates and
to attempt to capture unsystematic changes with a random coefficients
model.
3.Methodology
Given that our focus is on incorporating the effects of systematic and
unsystematic policy changes on the coefficients in an exchange rate
equation, we adopt a simple version of (6), abstracting from variations in
a risk premium, specification of disturbances causing systematic deviations
from purchasing power parity, and representations of expected future
8exogenous variables. With these qualifications, we proceed to examine the
following equation (all variables in log first differences):
(7) StU0 + a1JR + a2JP+U3USRt+a4USP
(0)(+) (—) (—) (+)
or
where a =(a0,a1, a2, a3, a4)'
xt
=(1,JRt, IP, VSRtI USPt)
St
=yenper dollar; monthly average of daily data.
JR(USR) log of domestic (exogenous) portion of the monetary base
for Japan (United States); measured by 'monetary authority
reserve money' (line 14) in IMP International Financial
Statistics.
JP(USP)=log of industrial production for Japan (United States);
line 66c of IMF International Financial Statistics.
Equation (7) implies a number of maintained hypotheses, including:
(a) stable money demand functions; (b)after—tax covered interest parity
with stable effective marginal tax rates; (c) stable intervention and
sterilization policies in both countries; (d) current growth rates of
explanatory variables as proxies for both current and expected future
growth rates; and (e)the 'real' yen/dollar rate follows a random walk.
Violations of (a), (b) [stable effective marginal tax rates] and (c) can be
entertained under the random coefficients approach employed below to
estimate (7). Simple extrapolitive models (AR—i, with seasonal terms for
Japanese reserves) adequately model growth rates for explanatory variables,
so current growth rates capture both current actual and expected future
growth rates. Examination of the real yen/dollar rate behavior during the
July, 1973 —June,1982 sample period reveals that residuals from its log
9first differences are 'white noise' Q(24) =23.4which is consistent with
(0).
Remaining questions regarding maintained hypotheses center on the
assumption of perfect substitutability between yen and dollar assets
(satisfaction of covered after tax interest parity.) Evidence on perfect
substitutability is mixed with Henderson et al. (1984) reporting that
perfect substitutability between yen and dollar assets cannot be rejected
under rational expectations while Hansen and flodrick (1983) are unable to
reject the hypothesis of a time—varying risk premium for the yen—dollar
rate.
In effect, our estimates of exchange rate equations reported below
allow for time—varying parameters while imposing after—tax covered interest
parity and employing only the simplest measures of explanatoryvariables.6
Inmost econometric applications, the coefficients are estimated as
constants throughout the time period being analyzed. This approachis
likely to be inappropriate when applied to an equation such as (7),where
the coefficients are subject to the several sources of variation just
discussed. Hildreth and Houck (1968) have outlined a procedure whereby
consistent estimators can be obtained for a model which allows the
coefficients to vary over time. The estimated coefficients are interpreted
as the 'mean response' coefficients. The statisticalmodel is summarized
by:









Consistent estimators for a1 can be obtained with a generalized least
squares procedure using an estimated covariance matrix for e:
(10) 0 =(M'MY1M'u
where M is a matrix containing the squared elements of (I—X(X'XY1X') and U
containsthe squared residuals from an ordinary least squares regression on




The OLS and random coefficients results from regressions on equation
(7) appear in Table 1.The OLS equation yields virtually no explanatory
power as R2 =.01.Applying the random coefficients procedure outlined
above provides no dramatic improvement——indeed the signs of the U.S.
variables are the reverse of those implied by theory.
11TABLR 1





Constant (std. error —.0009 —.0005
in parentheses) (.0003) (.0006)
lap. Res. + —.0210 .0401
(.0241) (.0006)
lap. Prod. — .1191 .0372
(1.71> (.0455)
U.S.Res. — —.0071 .0499
(.3323) (.0076)
U.S. Prod. + .0007 —.1683
(2.061) (.0750)
*Allvariables on log first differences.
However, a close look at the data reveals that (7) is not an entirely
correct specification of the exchange rate equation. Japanese reserves
systematically rise sharply in December, and fall by roughly the same
magnitude the following January. The magnitude of these end of year
reserve changes averages roughly five times that of the monthly changes
throughout the remainder of the year.
Systematic policy changes of this nature can be handled using OLS and




12where JRD takes the value of JRt if the month is December and is zero
otherwise. JRJ is similarly defined.
Failure to account for this policy shift is likely to bias the
estimate of a1 downward in a regression on (7), as the dramatic increase
(decrease) in Japanese reserves in December (January) is likely to be
heavily discounted in foreign exchange markets. We thus expect to see an
increase in the estimated coefficient for a1, and hypothesize that the
signs of a5 and a6 are negative in (12).
The econometric results from estimation of (12) are presented in Table
2. The OLS equation shows some improvement over its counterpart, although
again, only the estimated coefficient on Japanese reserves changes exceeds
its standard error. In addition, the signs of the estimated coefficients
for Japanese Production and U.S. Reserves are the opposite of what the
theory predicts.
However, as hypothesized, incorporating systematic policy changes
through the inclusion of the December and January Reserve dwmnies results
in an increase in the estimated coefficient for Japanese Reserves, with
negative coefficients estimated for the dummy variables.
The application of the random coefficients model yields improvement in
each and every statistical category. All estimated coefficients are of the
hypothesized sign, and the standard error of each coefficient is reduced
relative to its counterpart in Table 1. (The standard error of the mean
response coefficient for Japanese Reserve changes is reduced relative to
the estimated coefficient by a factor of four). R—squared rises to .4039
and the Durbin—Watson statistic also improves to 1.8606.
13TABLE 2






Constant (std. errors —.0026 -.0009
in parentheses) (.0003) (1.998 x 10-6)
Jap. Res. + .1554 .1839
(.1172) (.00068)
JR Dec. — —.1521 —.1780
(.1634) (.0011)
JR Jan. — —.1901 —.1633
(.2196) (.0024)
lap. Prod. — .1121 —.0063
(1.687) (.0135)
U.S. Res. — .0103 —.0463
(.3579) (.00350)
U.S. Prod. + .0327 .3163
(2.153) (.0228)
*Allvariables in log first differences.
In both versions, the effect of the dummies is to reduce sharply the
impact of Japanese Reserve Changes in December and January. The degreeto
which such reserve changes are reduced in the random coefficients version
is roughly the same in both months, leaving a small, positive effect of
Japanese Reserve Changes on the exchange rate during thesemonths.
14Overall, our results are consistent 'with the hypothesis that regime
changes and/or instability of money demand equations account for a
significant portion of the poor fit of yen/dollar equations during the
'floating' period.8
5.Svary
Thispaper presents results of estimating an exchange rate equation in
light of theoretical considerations regarding changes in sterilization and
intervention policy and tax policy which imply that the coefficients in the
equation will not behave as fixed parameters in a given sample period, as
standard econometric practice assumes. We compare the results of ordinary
least squares and a random coefficients model of the Japanese yen—U.S.
dollar exchange rate during the 'floating' period of July 1973 through June
1982.
When systematic end of year policy changes affecting Japanese reserves
are explicitly modeled, both OLS and the random coefficients model show
increased explanatory power. Therandomcoefficients model appears to be
superior to OLS however, by allowing the coefficients to vary over time as
required by the economic theory discussed above, estimates of the mean
response coefficients for the floating period all have the hypothesized
sign, and explanatory power is sharply increased. These improved results
strongly suggest that a random coefficients model is a useful technique for
modeling exchange rate determination during quasi floating regimes where
responses of exchange rates to changes in relative excess money supplies
are likely to vary over time.
151. For an excellent 'review of the troops' see the volumes edited by
Frenkel (1983) and Hawkins, Levich and Wihlborg (1982).
2. See Henderson j. (1984) for a discussion of evidence on imperfect
substitutability and Hodrick and Srivastava (1984) for a state—of—the—
art discussion of time varying risk premiums. On efficiency and
related hypotheses, see also Hansen and Hodrick (1980).
3. Makin (1984) demonstrates that failure to specify arbitrage equilibria
in after—tax terms may bias investigations of deviations from
uncovered interest parity toward rejection of the hypothesis that
assets denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes.
4. If country 2 has an asymmetric tax treatment of exchange gains and
interest income then equation (1) may hold without satisfying covered
interest parity for country 2. This case is examined for Canada and
the United States by Levi (1977).Such asymmetry raises the
possibility of simultaneous two way capital flows and also raises an
interesting question of how long run equilibrium is achieved. For now
we assume that countries 1 and 2 have symmetric tax systems so that
equation (1) describes covered interest parity for both or, alterna-
tively that country 1 is so large relative to country 2 that it
dominates markets sufficiently to preclude significant deviations from
equation (1).
5.SeeAliber (1973, 1975) and Frenkel and Levich (1975).
6. Lagged independent variables were tried but added nothing to the
explanatory power of contemporaneous independent variables alone.
167.Equation (11) bypasses the question of the estimated variances of the
random coefficients. This is necessary due to the inclusion of dummy
variables in the model, which causes the matrix required for
estimation of the variance of the coefficients to be singular. This
precludes the possibility of providing estimates of the and hence
a time path of the random coefficients.
8. Hodrick and Srivastava (1984) and Papell (1984) report evidence of
regime changes but also find evidence of systematic deviations from
uncovered interest parity.
17APPENDIX
11014K! SUPPLY: STRRTLT7ATION AND INTVENTI0N
Moneysupply is represented by a log linear money 'production
function' which determines money supply in terms of domestic and foreign




D1 domestic assets of central bank in country '1.'
X1 =foreignexchange reserves of central bank in country '1.'
=elasticityof money supply with respect to D1.
=elasticityof money supply with respect to X1.
In logs (A.1) becomes:
(A.2) m1 =j1d1+j2x1.
Sterilization links d negatively to reserves
(A.3) d1 de1 —(i—st1)x
where: de1 log of autonomous portion of domestic assets of central
bank in country 1.
st1 =sterilizationcoefficient in country 1 1st1 0 implies
full sterilization; st1 =1.0implies
zero sterilization and d1 =de
1
Intervention links reserves to the exchange rate where:
18(A.4) x =—ys.
measures the elasticity of official reserves with respect to the
exchange rate, s. The faster currency 1 depreciates (a rise in s) the
faster country 1 reserves are lost (and the faster 'foreign' reserves
rise). If analogous expressions apply for country 2, then the relative
money supply term for countries 1 and 2, can be written as:
(A.5) t = +
where:
* = j1dej—i1 de2
O(O)[—y1(j2—j1(1—st1)) —T(ii(1St))]
If intervention dominates sterilization so that currency depreciation
lowers x and raises x2 then 0 is unambiguously negative. If sterilization
eradicates intervention's affect on the monetary base 0 =0.In this case
= andthere is no need to take account of either intervention or
sterilization in modeling the money supply. The important thing about
(A5) from the standpoint of estimation is the fact that it links to '0',
the value of all reduced—forms describing the impact upon the exchange rate
of exogenous variables. And '0' in turn depends upon intervention and
sterilization policy parameters y and st (i1,2) which are likely to
change over time.
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